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1 Introduction
The public good nature of innovation and R&D investments has attracted economists
attention for decades. R&D activities generate products that are at least partially non-
excludable and non-rivalrous. This was forcefully pointed out by Arrow (1962) and is a
key ingredient in the seminal Romer (1990) model. According to economic theory, there
are many di¤erent options available to deal with market failure due to externalities such
as tax credits, subsidies, extending property rights and public production. All these
policy instruments have been actively used to promote innovation and R&D activities
by most OECD governments, but both the level and the optimal mix of instruments
remain an open question. A large literature estimating e¤ects of R&D subsidies has
therefore emerged. While there is a fairly broad consensus that R&D tax credit is an
e¤ective tool for stimulating additional research, there is no strong consensus regarding
the e¤ectiveness of direct R&D grants.1
Our study focuses on R&D subsidies targeted at specic projects, and in particular
on their impact on privately funded R&D investments. We contribute to the existing
literature both by bringing new evidence on the e¤ectiveness of matching grants R&D
subsidies and by analyzing dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsidies.
Using panel data for Norwegian high-tech rms from 1982-1995, we rst examine the
investment in R&D for rms receiving direct R&D grants from di¤erent public sources.2
Our main question is whether public R&D subsidies result in a net increase or decrease
in R&D expenditure, and we nd that R&D subsidies in the industries we study have
been successfully targeted at rms that have expanded their R&D investments. There
is little tendency to crowding out. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any
signicant degree of additionalityassociated with the subsidies either, even though
the government requires that rms contribute 50 % own risk capital to subsidized
projects. This own risk capital seems to be taken from ordinary R&D budgets.3
Next, we pursue the issue of dynamic or longer-run e¤ects of R&D subsidies on
R&D investments. Our empirical investigation suggests that such e¤ects are positive,
1The literature on the response of R&D investments to tax credits has been surveyed by Gri¢ th,
Sandler and Van Reenen (1995), Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Ientile and Mairesse (2009). The
literature on direct R&D grants is surveyed by David, Hall and Toole (2000) who conclude that the
ndings overall are ambivalent. Garcia-Quevedo (2004) does a formal meta-analysis of the literature
and concludes similarly that the econometric evidence . . . is ambiguous. Cosconati and Sembenelli
(2010) provide a useful survey of the most recent literature.
2 In 2002, the Research Council of Norway introduced an R&D tax credit scheme in addition to direct
R&D grants. The data used in the present study do not extend into this period. The relationship
between the R&D tax credit and other innovation policy instruments is analyzed in Hægeland and
Møen (2007).
3Using similar data for the years 2001-2007, Henningsen, Hægeland and Møen (2011) nd stronger
additionality associated with grants from the Research Council of Norway. This suggests that the
e¤ectiveness of this policy tool has improved over time. This contrast the nding in Cincera, Czarnitzki
and Thorwarth (2009) who report that the e¢ ciency of public spending on R&D activities in stimulating
additional R&D in the business sector in Norway has declined over time. However, Cincera et al. use
a very di¤erent methodology, DEA, on macro data from a panel of OECD countries. They also di¤er
by using all public R&D spendings as input in the analysis.
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while conventional models of R&D-investments predict negative dynamic e¤ects. We
present a theoretical analysis of this question, where we argue that learning-by-doing
e¤ects in R&D may explain our empirical results. Such learning e¤ects will generate
positive feedback loops where temporary R&D subsidies increase the protability of
future R&D investments. We present estimates for a structural econometric model of
R&D investment incorporating learning e¤ects in line with the theoretical model.
Mowerys (1995) survey of the practice of technology policy points out that most
OECD countries have grants and subsidy schemes for R&D where government funds
are aimed at complementing and stimulating private R&D investments targeted at
innovations with civilian industrial applications. The evidence regarding e¤ectiveness
is, however, mixed.
Scott (1984) concludes that federally funded R&D in private rms tends to stimulate
the rmsown R&D expenditure, while Lichtenberg (1984) nd no such tendency when
he control for problems with selection bias embedded in Scotts estimate of the e¤ect
of federally funded R&D.4 Keck (1993) also argue that recipients of public R&D grants
do not increase their overall R&D activities, suggesting that public funds substitute
for private nancing in the German rms he studies. More recent studies of German
technology policy reverse this nding, see e.g. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) who nd
a large degree of additionality in public R&D grants using data from both Western
and Eastern Germany. Using comparable data from Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Spain and South Africa, Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2010) conclude that on average,
rms would have invested signicantly less in R&D if they had not received subsidies.
Moreover, they nd that all these ve countries except South Africa would benet from
an extension of their subsidy policies. Lach (2002), analyze a matching grants subsidy
program in Israel, and nds positive additionality. The strength of the estimated e¤ect
fades with rm size, however. Busom (2000), using Spanish data nds full crowding out
in about 30 % of the rms in her sample, while González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005),
using a structural approach, report no crowding out of private funds in their sample
of Spanish rms.5 Based on US data from the Small Business Innovation Research
program (SBIR), Wallsten (2000) nds evidence that the grants crowd out rm-nanced
R&D spending dollar for dollar. Wallsten claims to control for endogeneity, but his
results contrast with those of Lerner (1999). Using a di¤erent identication strategy,
Lerner nds a positive e¤ects of SBIR awards, although the positive e¤ect is conned to
rms in areas with substantial venture capital activity. Studying the US pre-commercial
Advanced Technology Program (ATP), Feldman and Kelley (2003) conclude that ATP
appears to provide a certication function that increases the amount of funds that
4Most of the federal funds studied by Scott (1984) and Lichtenberg (1984, 1987) are military con-
tracts while later US programs like SBIR and ATP have a broader scope.
5The applications of structural methods to R&D subsidies have been limited, but another attempt
is presented by Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2010), who study targeted R&D subsidies awarded by
the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes). They nd that expected e¤ects
of the subsidies are very heterogeneous, but estimate that the social rate of return is 30-50 %.
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rms are able to raise subsequently. Hall and Ma¢ oli (2008) survey evaluations of
government Technology Development Funds (TDF) in Argentina, Chile and Panama.
They interpret the evidence to suggest that TDF-support does not crowd out private
investments in R&D, but rather have a positive e¤ect on R&D intensity.
It is not too surprising that the e¤ects di¤er across these various studies, since public
R&D schemes di¤er considerably in their aims. Moreover, there are several econometric
di¢ culties related to selection and measurement involved in such evaluation studies, as
stressed by Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000), Ja¤e (2002) and Cerulli (2010) among
others.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 discuss the matching
grant property of the Norwegian R&D subsidy scheme, and section 3 discuss the data.
Section 4 presents a rst look at the additionality data, and section 5 presents the
main empirical results on short run additionality. Section 6 prepares the ground for an
empirical analysis of long term e¤ects of R&D subsidies by discussing dynamic e¤ects
and presenting a new theory model. Section 7 develops the theory model in section 6
into an emprical framework and presents structural estimates. Section 8 concludes and
discuss remaining loose ends.
2 Matching grants R&D subsidy programs
In Norway there is a long tradition for an activist government policy towards the high
technology industries, dating back to the aftermath of World War II (Wicken, 1994).
Electronics in particular, was considered to be of strategic importance not only in a
military perspective, but in a general economic perspective. In the 1980s this focus
broadened to include general information technology. Key politicians and scientist
rmly believed that private rms underinvested in R&D and new technology, and the
most important policy instrument of these programs was therefore R&D support.
A common feature of Norwegian R&D grant programs has been the requirement
that companies receiving subsidies must co-nance the supported projects. Matching
grants have been the most common criteria, but sometimes the own risk has been more
than 50 % and sometimes less. Despite the formality about own risk capital, it is
obviously possible that subsidies in reality crowd out private investments, or at least
that some of the private investments spent on subsidized projects would be invested in
R&D even without subsidies.
To aid the discussion, and to prepare a model of matching grants R&D-subsidies,
let
R = RG +RPG +RPP (1)
where R is total R&D investments, RG is the R&D-subsidy received from the govern-
ment, RPG is the part of the subsidized R&D projects which a rm has to nance
itself, i.e. the own risk capital, and RPP is the R&D investments which the rm un-
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dertakes in non-subsidized projects. Let total R&D investments nanced by the rm
be RP = RPP +RPG: Matching grants imply that RPG = RG:
The full e¤ect of a subsidy on the rmsR&D investments is given by
dR
dRG
=
@RPP
@RG
+
@RPP
@RPG
 @R
PG
@RG
+
@RPG
@RG
+
@RPG
@RPP
 @R
PP
@RG
+ 1
=

2 +
@RPP
@RPG

(2)
since by the denition of a matching grant regime @R
PG
@RG
= 1 and @R
PP
@RG
= 0 can be
assumed without loss of generality6.
Two properties of the regime are critical to the rmsinvestment decision.7 First, is
the question of how well informed the governmental agency who allocates the grant is.
Asymmetric information between private rms and the governmental agency will a¤ect
to what extent it is possible for rms to nance the own risk capital using ordinary
R&D budgets. Second, is the question of whether the rm, if subsidized, faces a binding
constraint on the size of the subsidized project, i.e. whether subsidized rms receive
subsidies at the margin. Møen and Rybalka (2011) nd that the probability of receiving
a grant is decreasing in the amount of money applied for per year, all else equal. This
may suggest that it is rational for the rms to constrain themselves, but given that we
do not know how much R&D rms would do if given a 50 % subsidy with certainty, it
is not possible to know whether rms in general are subsidized at the margin.
Figure 1 illustrates in a simplistic way the rmsdemand for R&D. The dashed
rectangle with base abc represents a subsidized R&D-project. w is the unit cost of
R&D in the market, e.g. the hourly wage of a researcher, and R is the level of R&D
that the rm will choose if it does not receive a subsidy. If the governmental agency
is perfectly informed about R; it will only subsidize R&D projects to the right of this
level. This is the case we dene as full additionality, implying @R
PP
@RPG
= 0 , dR
dRG
= 2:
The government then induces rms to increase their total R&D by two dollars when
giving them a subsidy of one dollar because of the own risk capital requirement.
Consider now a situation where the governmental agency is not perfectly informed
about the rmsR; the optimal level of R&D investments without subsidies. The rms
then want to move as much as possible of their subsidized projects to the left of R in
order to increase the private returns to the projects. If the rms succeed in moving the
6As RPGt = R
G
t ; considering
@RPPt
@RGt
= 0 simply means that the total e¤ect of the subsidies is measured
by the term @R
PP
t
@RPGt
:
7Application costs are a third important property. We refrain from a formal treatment of application
costs, because very little is known about the size of these costs. The perception that application costs
in the matching grants program were large, however, motivated the introduction of an R&D tax credit
scheme in Norway in 2002. This scheme has a very simple application process, and it has attracted
applications from a lot of small rms with little R&D experience that had not previously applied for
direct grants, see Cappelen et al (2010). This suggests that small rms with little knowledge capital
self-selected out of the programs analyzed in this paper. Takalo et al. (2010), however, estimate
application costs to be low on average in a sample of Finnish R&D grant recipients.
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projects entirely to the left of R, there is full crowding out and @R
PP
@RPG
=  2, dR
dRG
= 0.
Subsidies are then pure transfers, and the government does not achieve anything. If, on
the other hand, there is some, but not full, crowding out, @R
PP
@RPG
2 h 2; 1i , dR
dRG
2
h0; 1i. One dollar spent on R&D subsidies will increase total R&D investments, but by
less than a dollar since the rms reduce their privately nanced R&D after receiving the
subsidies. If there is neither crowding out, nor additionality, @R
PP
@RPG
=  1, dR
dRG
= 1: In
this case a governmental R&D subsidy does not inuence the rmsprivately nanced
R&D, and the subsidies will therefore increase total R&D investments dollar by dollar.
With some, but not full, additionality, @R
PP
@RPG
2 h 1; 0i , dR
dRG
2 h1; 2i : One dollar
spent on R&D subsidies then increases the rmsprivately nanced R&D, but not with
as much as a dollar. Total R&D investments will therefore increase by less than two
dollars.
In order to discuss whether the rms are free to decide the size of the subsidized
projects, i.e. whether they are subsidized at the margin, we need to distinguish between
the unit cost of R&D in the market, and the rmsmarginal cost of R&D. Let therefore
w0 denote the rmsmarginal cost. If there is full additionality, and rms are allowed
to decide the size of the subsidized projects, their marginal cost is w0 = 12w, and they
will expand their R&D investments until R = R in Figure 1. If there is less than full
additionality (but no crowding out), and the rms are allowed to decide the size of the
subsidized projects, their marginal cost of R&D is
w0 = w

dRP
dR

= w
 
dRP
dRG
1 + dR
P
dRG
!
= w

1 + 
(3)
where we have renamed dR
P
dRG
= ; and  2 [0; 1] : With full additionality  = 1. Note
that as  ! 0; (neither additionality, nor crowding out) the marginal cost of R&D
according to the formula above approaches zero. The intuition behind this is that rms
can expand their R&D activities at a very low cost if they are allowed to decide the
size of subsidized projects where most of the own risk part is privately protable, i.e.
to the left of R: However, the governmental agency is bound to become suspicious if
rms apply for subsidized projects which are large relative to their total R&D activities.
This indicates that it is unlikely that rms are subsidized at the margin unless there
is a signicant degree of additionality associated with the subsidies. If the rms are
constrained with respect to the size of the subsidized projects, their marginal cost of
R&D is w0 = w.
Finally, let us consider a case with full or some crowding out. The size of the
subsidized project will then be limited by the optimal private R&D to be crowded out
(R in Figure 1), and the marginal cost of R&D will be w: Hence, rms will in this
case not be subsidized at the margin, even though their R&D investments will be larger
than R:
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3 Data
The core of the high-tech industries is the manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and commu-
nication equipment, ISIC 3825 and 3832.8 This is the kind of production most intensely
promoted by the government, but subsidies have been awarded to a wider set of high-
tech projects than those performed within these two sub-industries. To obtain a sample
of reasonable size, and to avoid classication problems associated with companies hav-
ing production and research activities covering a broader class of products than ISIC
3825 and 3832, we have used production and R&D aggregated to the three-digit line
of business level. For the purpose of empirical analysis in this paper, we have therefore
dened high-tech as the manufacture of machinery, electrical equipment and technical
instruments, i.e. ISIC 382, 383 and 385. These industries have many R&D performing
rms and are technologically related.
3.1 Data sources
The analysis uses merged data from R&D surveys and time series les of the man-
ufacturing statistics. The manufacturing statistics of Statistics Norway is an annual
census of all plants in the Norwegian manufacturing industries. From this source we use
information on sales and cash ow. See Halvorsen et al. (1991) for documentation of
the data base. R&D surveys are available for the years 1982-85, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993
and 1995. Since 1991 the data have been collected by Statistics Norway. Before 1991,
the data were collected by the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientic and Industrial
Research (NTNF).9 See Skorge et al. (1996) for denitions and industry level gures.
We have aggregated R&D expenditures to the three digit (ISIC) line of business level
before merging these variables to the manufacturing statistics. This means that our
observations are not rms, but business units. A business unit is dened as all pro-
duction activities within a rm having the same three digit ISIC classication. Single
plant rms consist of one business unit, whereas multiplant rms may consist of several
business units. Approximately 75 % of all manufacturing rms are single plant rms.
3.2 Sample construction
The R&D surveys have close to full coverage of rms with more than 20 employees in
the industries studied, i.e. ISIC 382, 383 and 385. There are altogether 1658 time-year
observations of business units at the three-digit line of business level in these industries
included in the surveys. 1278 of these are successfully merged to the manufacturing
8 ISIC refers to the Norwegian Standard Industrial Classication of 1983 that builds on United
NationsInternational Standard Industrial Classication of all Economic Activities.
9Using these types of surveys, one may worry whether rms answer strategically or carelessly, but
rms are commanded by law to answer, and the questionnaires are auditedin order to detect mistakes.
Hence, the data quality is perceived to be good and the data has been used in several microeconometric
studies, starting with Klette (1996).
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statistics. 714 observations had a time average of more than 20 employees, positive R&D
investments and were included in at least two surveys. This sample was moderately
trimmed leaving 697 observations for our empirical investigations. Outliers were dened
as rms having value added per man-hour below the one percent percentile, above the
99 percent percentile or having an R&D intensity above the 99 percent percentile.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 gives some sample statistics. The panel consists of 192 business units with
an average of 3.6 observations per business unit. All the included units are R&D
performers, and 43 % of the observations have a positive subsidy variable. The average
R&D intensity is 0.07. The average subsidy share, i.e., the share of subsidies in total
R&D, is 0.23 for the units that receive subsidies. Hence, the degree of subsidization is
substantial.
3.3 Variable construction
Sales are measured as the value of gross production corrected for taxes and subsidies.
Cash Flow before R&D is measured as sales subtracted labor expenses, material ex-
penses and rentals. To this measure are added R&D expenses nanced by own means
as given in the R&D surveys. Nominal variables in the manufacturing statistics are
deated using industry level deators from the Norwegian national accounts. The R&D
variables include both intramural and extramural R&D expenditures. The R&D ex-
penditures, consisting mainly of labor costs, are deated using an index based on the
movement of average wage in ISIC 382, 383 and 385.
For the years 1982-1987, planned R&D is reported in man-years. When estimating
the Euler equation in section 7.3, this variable is converted to Norwegian kroner using
the rm-specic ratio between R&D man-years and R&D investments in the year of
the survey, and inated with the growth in the R&D price index during the following
year.10
4 Crowding out or additionality: A rst look
4.1 Questionnaire studies
To what extent subsidies actually stimulate R&D has been an important issue when
technology programs have been evaluated. Table 2 summarizes questionnaire studies
10Another weakness with the data for planned R&D is that they in 1995 include R&D-related capital
investments. To adjust for this, the variable is reduced by the 1995 share of R&D-related capital
investments in the sum of R&D and R&D-related capital investments. There is also an end-of-sample
problem related to the instruments used in the Euler equation. Sales for 1996 are not included in the
data set, and the 1995-observations therefore lack our proxy for expected sales. To circumvent this,
we have constructed the proxy using sales in 1995, if possible, multiplied by the rm-specic growth
rate from 1994 to 1995. We use a similar procedure for rms that exit the panel before 1995, and to
construct the instrumental variable, lagged sales, where this is missing.
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undertaken on this account in Norway. Looking at the pooled results at the rightmost
column, about 18 % of the supported projects would have been undertaken in full
without subsidies, while the subsidy was not completely crowded out in 82 % of the
projects. Furthermore, according to the evaluation reports, 34 % of the projects had
full additionality. Hence, these questionnaire studies suggest that R&D subsidies as
implemented by the public agencies in Norway exert a positive inuence on the R&D
investments in private rms. It also seems that the degree of crowding out has been
decreasing over time. This trend could indicate a learning process in the public agencies
implementing the subsidy schemes, but it could as well indicate that rms have become
less honest when they respond to the questionnaires. One would in any case suspect
that these verbal reports are biased towards not admitting crowding out, as this would
reduce the likelihood of similar programs being launched in the future. A more analytic
approach is therefore desirable.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 The e¤ect of changes in the level of subsidies on deviation from
planned R&D
One way to shed light on the e¤ect of subsidies, is to examine the correlation between
changes in the level of subsidies and the deviation from planned R&D. Such an analysis
is possible because the rms in the R&D surveys have been asked about their R&D
investment plans both one and two years ahead.11 If a rms succeed in getting (addi-
tional) subsidies in year t, and subsidies stimulate R&D expenditures, we will expect
that the rm invest more in R&D in year t than what they had planned before they
got to know about the increase in subsidies.12
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The R&D surveys were conducted annually from 1982 to 1985. For these years
it is possible to calculate the correlation between the change in R&D subsidy and
the deviation between planned and performed R&D within a one-year horizon, i.e.
Corr [(Subsidyt   Subsidyt 1) ; (R&Dt   Et 1R&Dt)]. From the rst row in Table 3
we see that the one-year horizon correlation coe¢ cient based on the available years is
essentially zero. This lack of correlation most likely indicates that rms know the level
of subsidies they will receive one year in advance and hence that they have already
included the response to the expected subsidies in their investment plans13
11From 1982 until 1989 the R&D investment plans were given in terms of man-years while from 1989
until 1995 they were given in nominal terms.
12 Implicitly this formulation assumes that rms expect a stable subsidy level. This is obviously a
rough approximation.
13The rms apply about a year in advance, and the data for year t are collected early in year t+ 1;
i.e. year t+1 has started when the rms give their expectations for that year. Many of the applications
for grants have probably been answered at that time.
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The two-year horizon results are given in Table 3, rows two and three, based on
R&D measures in man-years and nominal terms respectively. The coe¢ cients strongly
indicate that the correlation between an increase or decrease in subsidies and a devia-
tion from planned R&D, is positive and signicant. Our interpretation of this is that
an increase in subsidies induces the companies to undertake more research than they
otherwise would have done14. Note, however, that this does not give us any information
about the strength of the e¤ect. All that can be concluded is that there is not complete
crowding out. To determine whether there is some degree of crowding out, some or
full additionality, or maybe even more than full additionality, we need to frame the
question within a regression analysis.
5 Short run regression analysis
In this section we regress the rms R&D investments in year t on R&D subsidies
received in year t, controlling for other factors determining R&D investments. Our aim
is to estimate the causal e¤ect of the subsidies, but establishing the counterfactual, i.e.
what would have happened in absence of subsidies, is challenging. The recipients of
subsidies are always a selected sample, and this makes it di¢ cult to construct a valid
control group. The more recent additionality literature discuss this problem within a
treatment framework, see e.g. Lach (2002) or Cerulli (2010).15 Let us assume that
the R&D investments of a rm i in period t, is given by
Rit = iDi + t + i + uit (4)
where Di is a dummy variable which is one if the rm has received R&D subsidies
and zero otherwise. We ignore time subscript on Di for simplicity, and, for now, also
abstract from other observable regressors. t represents unobservable time shocks com-
mon across rms, i represents permanent unobserved di¤erences in rm investments
related e.g. to managerial ability or the quality of the research team, while uit repre-
sents unobserved temporary uctuations in investments around the rm specic means,
due to e¤ects specic for individual R&D-projects. Equation (4) incorporates heteroge-
nous responses to the R&D support (ex post) as indicated by the subscript i on the
-coe¢ cient, and the distribution of these coe¢ cients may di¤er systematically between
the supported and the non-supported rms. Indeed, the agency allocating the R&D
support might try to allocate their funds on the basis of anticipated di¤erences in the
is.
14An alternative interpretation is that those who came across a good research project after they gave
the survey information both changed their plans and received subsidies. We do, however, believe that
the time span involved is somewhat too short for this to be a plausible explanation. Within less than
two years the rms would have to come up with the idea, le a detailed application for R&D support,
have the application accepted and start the R&D project.
15This exposition borrows from Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000).
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We will treat i as a rm specic parameter and allow it to be correlated with
Di. Then the estimated impact parameter is not biased if the supported rms are
non-randomly selected, as long as the selection is based on rm characteristics that
are largely invariant over time. Assuming that data are available before and after the
supported rms have received their support, say at times t0 and t1, we may use the
estimator
bdid =  Rst1  Rst0   Rnt1  Rnt0
= R
s  Rn;
where R
s
and R
n
are the average changes in R&D investments from before to after
the allocation of an R&D subsidy, and the superscripts s and n refer to the subsidized
and the non-subsidized rms, respectively. In the econometric literature, this estimator
is referred to as the di¤erence-in-di¤erencesestimator (DID). Assuming that Di and
uit are uncorrelated, we have that
plim bdid = E (ijDi = 1)  S
which is the parameter of interest, representing the average impact of the R&D-subsidies
on the subsidized rms.16
The DID estimator derived above is closely related to the standard xed e¤ects
(within) estimator. Since we have observations for more than two years, and subsidy
is a continuous variable, using the xed e¤ects estimator is preferable in practice.17
With respect to control variables, we draw on Swenson (1992) who summarizes the
theoretical R&D investment literature into three main hypotheses about what a¤ects
the level of R&D investments in private rms. First, expected sales might be important
if the development costs of new products or processes are xed. Second, technological
opportunity may vary across industries and time. This will in turn a¤ect the returns
to R&D and hence the incentive to invest. Third, the degree of appropriability is
important. If it is di¢ cult to protect innovations from leaking out to competitors,
less prot may be made, and the incentive to innovate is reduced accordingly. In
empirical studies, expected sales are often proxied by current sales. We have also
included the square of sales to account for possible non-linearities in size. With respect
to technological opportunities and the degree of appropriability, these e¤ects should to
16Notice, that this parameter (the mean impact of the treatment on the treated) may not be infor-
mative of what would happen if the R&D support scheme was extended to previously non-subsidized
rms, when there are systematic di¤erences in the responses to R&D subsidies between the subsidized
and the non-subsidized rms.
17This is particularly so if the ideosyncratic errors, uit, are not serially correlated. Note, however,
that both the DiD (rst di¤erence) estimator and the xed e¤ects (within) estimator assumes strict
exogeneity. This assumption is violated if current technology shocks have a feedback e¤ect on future
subsidies. In that case a dynamic panel data estimator is required. The similarity between our estimates
in Table 4, column 1 (FE) and column 2 (FD), suggests that this kind of feedback is not a serious
problem in our sample.
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a large degree be absorbed by the time dummies (t ) and the rm or rather business
unit xed e¤ect (i) discussed above. According to this, our regression equation is
Rit = 0 + 1Sit + 2S
2
it + 3CFit + 4R
G
it + t + i + uit: (5)
RGit is public subsidies as before, and the coe¢ cient on subsidies, 4 =
@Rit
@RGit
; is
the parameter of primary interest. Sit is sales and CFit, is cash ow before R&D
investments. We have included the rmscash ow as a proxy for liquidity constraints
inuencing the level of investments, since R&D subsidies are partly motivated by the
belief that R&D investments might be discriminated against in the capital markets. As
pointed out by e.g. Bond et al. (2004), this cash ow variable may also be a proxy for
investment opportunities beyond what is picked up by current sales. In our context,
this is not a severe problem, since it is not our aim to establish whether or not liquidity
constraints are present.18 All observations are weighted by the square root of inverse
sales to correct for heteroscedasticity.
We acknowledge that the specication above may not solve all potential selection
problems. In particular, there may be correlation between the temporary shocks (uit)
and subsidy awards (RGit). As pointed out by Kauko (1996) and Ja¤e (2002), rms may
apply for subsidies when they discover particularly promising R&D projects. In that
case they may invest more in R&D than usual even in absence of subsidies, and we
will overestimate the impact of R&D-subsidies on company nanced R&D investments.
However, the bias may also go in the opposite direction. In Klette and Møen (1998),
using the same data set as we do in this paper, we nd that subsidized rms perform
poor in terms of productivity and growth. We speculate that this is caused by the
government subsidizing some large rms that were facing particularly severe problems
when the IT industry was restructured towards the end of the 1980s. Subsidies may
then be correlated with unobservable rm characteristics that a¤ect R&D investments
negatively, in which case we underestimate the impact of the subsidies. Finding instru-
mental variables to solve this kind of endogeneity problems is very challenging. In an
analysis investigating additionality in more recent Norwegian R&D subsidy programs,
Henningsen, Hægeland and Møen (2011) use proposal evaluation data to control for the
intention to do R&D, as suggested by Ja¤e (2002). This analysis shows that the bulk
of variation in proposal grades is across rms rather than within rms. They therefore
conclude that rm xed e¤ects go a long way towards solving the selection problem,
but they also nd evidence suggesting that there are measurement errors in the subsidy
variable causing a negative bias.
Theory does not say anything about functional form, and various specications
18As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the e¤ectiveness of matching grants may be lower than
that of alternative types of subsidies in face of liquidity constraints. Matching grants requires (in
principle) rms to have cash to nance 50 % of the project, and should therefore only be assigned to
rms that are not fully or severely rationed. However, these rms will have better chances to carry out
the investment even without public money.
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have been tried in the literature. A matching grants subsidy regime implies a linear
relationship between R&D investments and subsidies. This is the functional form used
by e.g. Wallsten (2000) and Lach (2002). However, many other studies, e.g. Bound
et al. (1984), suggest a loglinear relationship between R&D investments and sales.
We prefer a linear relationship since the e¤ect of subsidies is what we are primarily
interested in. Our empirical results are reported in Tables 4 to 7. Column (1) always
reports a linear functional form, estimated with xed e¤ects. We consider this to be
our main regression. To test the robustness of this specication, column (2) reports
a linear functional form estimated with the variables transformed to rst di¤erences
between years t and t   2 and column (3) reports a loglog functional form estimated
with xed e¤ects. The general impression from the tables is that the three di¤erent
specications agree on the main e¤ects. We will base our discussion on the results in
column (1) unless otherwise is stated.
5.1 Main results
From Table 4 we see that the additionality parameter, 4 is 1.03 and highly signicant.
This suggests that there is no crowding out, but nor does there seem to be any degree
of additionality. Estimating the regression without business unit xed e¤ects increases
the coe¢ cient by about 20 %. This shows that there is positive selection into the
subsidy programs as expected. Firms that receive subsidies tend to have unobserved
characteristics that are correlated with high levels of R&D investments. Note, however,
that the xed e¤ects estimator is more vulnerable to measurement errors than ordinary
least squares, hence 1.03 might be a somewhat conservative estimate (Griliches and
Hausman, 1986).
The results of the questionnaire studies indicated that the e¤ect of subsidies may
have changed over time. In a set of regressions not reported, we have investigated this
by including a dummy for observations from the 1990s in interaction with the subsidy
variable. The results do not indicate that the e¤ect of R&D subsidies has changed. We
have also run regressions where the sample is extended to include all manufacturing
industries19, but the coe¢ cient is still stable, 4 then being 0.98.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
With respect to the other variables, we see that sales squared has a signicantly
positive coe¢ cient, implying that both small and large rms are more R&D intensive
than medium size rms. This nding is supported by the empirical study of Bound et
al. (1984), but runs contrary to previous work on the relationship between size and
R&D cited in their article.20 Finally, cash ow has a positive and signicant e¤ect on
19This sample has 2141 observations, and is constructed in the same manner as the sample based on
high-tech industries alone. The results are not reported.
20 In the sample comprising all manufacturing industries, we nd a signicantly negative coe¢ cient
on sales squared, indicating that this relationship may vary across industries.
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R&D investments, suggesting that liquidity constraints may be relevant to the R&D
investment decision. In order to investigate this a bit further, we have constructed a
dummy for whether the rm that a business unit belongs to owns several business units
so that the cash ow of each individual business unit may not be a binding constraint
on investments.21 Including this dummy both separately and in interaction with cash
ow, we nd that business units which are part of a larger group have a lower cash ow
sensitivity and larger R&D investments as compared to stand alone business units. This
is consistent with the idea that cash ow proxies liquidity constraints for stand alone
rms. However, these results should be considered explorative as there are relatively
few such multi-business-unit-rms in the sample. Adding these extra controls have
only a negligible e¤ect on the additionality estimate.
5.2 Di¤erences between small and large rms
In Table 5 we report regressions studying whether there are di¤erences between small
and large rms. We do this by including a dummy variable for small and large business
units in interaction with the subsidy and cash ow variables. We have dened small
business units as units with average employment below the 25th percent percentile, i.e.
below 58 workers. Large units are dened accordingly as those larger than the 75th
percent percentile, i.e. having an average employment above 263 workers, cf. Table 1.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
In an interview study of Norwegian manufacturing rms, Hervik and Waagø (1997)
nd support for the hypothesis that large rms, having a portfolio of projects, will seek
to obtain public support for those projects they have already decided to undertake,
whereas small rms, being less diversied and possibly more liquidity constrained, will
nd subsidies with a matching grant claim to be a stimulus making increased R&D
investments possible. It is di¢ cult to nd support for this hypothesis in our data. The
only business units having some degree of additionality, approximately 25 %, associated
with R&D subsidies, are the large ones. For small units there is neither crowding out,
nor additionality, whereas for medium size units the point estimate indicates about
50 % crowding out. This nding might be rationalized if we extend the hypothesis of
Hervik and Waagø by taking account of monitoring costs. It is probably di¢ cult for the
governmental agencies to assess whether R&D projects for which small and medium
size rms apply, will be undertaken without support. The hypothesis of Hervik and
Waagø then explains why we nd crowding out for medium size rms, but not for small
rms. Large rms, however, are likely to be monitored more closely by the government,
as they receive large grants and are well known regular customers. If these rms
apply for projects which are obviously protable without subsidies, the governmental
21We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
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agencies might see through it, and they can even lose credibility with respect to future
applications. This may explain why we do not nd crowding out for these rms.
When it comes to cash ow, we see a similar, although somewhat less pronounced,
pattern, as both small and large business units have a larger coe¢ cient than medium
size units. These results are hard to explain and cast some doubt on the cash ow
variable being able to account for liquidity constraints.22
5.3 Di¤erences between the e¤ect of subsidies from various public
sources
The R&D surveys have detailed information on R&D investments by source of nance,
and this makes it possible to investigate whether the e¤ect of R&D subsidies varies
across di¤erent public sources. The main governmental agencies awarding R&D sub-
sidies have traditionally been research councils, industry funds and ministries. Pure
subsidies have mostly been awarded through research councils. Grants from industry
funds are often subsidized loans, but still with an own risk capital claim. Grants from
ministries consist of various R&D contracts, many of which are defense related. We
believe that the demand for own risk capital tends to be weaker in these projects.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Table 6 reports the results of regressions with subsidies from the three main sources
included as separate variables. We see that there are no clear cut di¤erences between the
e¤ects of the various subsidies, but all regressions agree that subsidies from industry
funds have a coe¢ cient which is somewhat lower than the others. If the sample is
extended to include all manufacturing industries, the regression results suggest that
subsidies from research councils have a somewhat more positive e¤ect than subsidies
from the other two sources (not reported).
5.4 Dynamic e¤ects
So far we have implicitly assumed that there are no dynamic e¤ects associated with
receiving R&D subsidies. As we will explain below, di¤erent models of accumulation of
knowledge have di¤erent predictions with respect to the dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsi-
dies. A very simple rst approach is to include lagged R&D subsidies in the regressions
above. The results are reported in Table 7. We see that R&D subsidies lagged two
years have a signicantly positive e¤ect in the xed e¤ects regression based on a linear
functional form. In column (2), using rst di¤erences, there is also a positive coe¢ -
cient, but it is not statistically signicant, while in column (3), the loglog specication,
22As pointed out by an anonymous referee, some of the cash ow e¤ect we try to estimate with
this specication may be absorbed by the rm xed e¤ects. How much of the relevant e¤ect that is
absorbed may vary between small, medium and large rms since they are likely to have di¤erent levels
of cash ow on average.
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there is a non-signicant negative coe¢ cient. When extending the sample to include
all manufacturing industries, the coe¢ cients in columns (1) and (2) increase both in
magnitude and signicance while the coe¢ cient in column (3) becomes essentially zero
(not reported).23 This suggests that R&D subsidies are likely to have a positive dy-
namic e¤ect, and we would like to point out explicitly the lack of evidence for a negative
e¤ect.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Dynamic e¤ects of subsidies are obviously important for public policies, as they
may inuence the social return to subsidies. Positive dynamic e¤ects indicate that the
government permanently changes the rmsprot opportunities in favor of more R&D
intensive products by awarding temporary subsidies which induce the rms to increase
their R&D investment. A positive dynamic e¤ect, then, will increase the social return
to R&D subsidies if the level of commercial R&D is below its social optimum at the
outset.
6 Dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsidies: A theoretical analy-
sis
We will now explore the dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsidies more thoroughly. We start
out by discussing the predictions of conventional models of R&D investments. Next
we present an alternative structural model which we nd better suited to explain the
data. This alternative model captures the idea that rms which have invested heavily in
R&D in the past, and hence have a large knowledge capital, will produce new knowledge
more e¢ ciently than less experienced rms. In the last part of the paper we attempt
to estimate this structural model, before summing up our main ndings.
6.1 The conventional R&D investment model
The most widely used specication for the accumulation of knowledge capital, K, is to
treat R&D the same way as physical capital i.e.
Kt = Kt 1 (1  ) +Rt: (6)
where  is the rate of depreciation, cf. Griliches (1979, 2000). As is well known, with
this specication, knowledge capital is adjusted so that
0(Kt) = w0t (r + ) wt+1 (7)
23The coe¢ cient in column (1) is then 0.58 and signicant at the 1 % level. Testing for di¤erences
between large and small rms, we nd that the positive dynamic e¤ect is strongest for small rms.
This positive small rm e¤ect can also be detected with a loglog specication. Further evidence for the
existence of this e¤ect is given in Figure 2, explained in section 6.1.
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where 0(Kt) is the nominal marginal prot of knowledge capital, w0t is the marginal
cost of R&D, r is the discount rate and wt+1 is the change in the market price of
R&D.24
If rms are subsidized at the margin, the e¤ect on optimal R&D investments of a 50
% subsidy can be quite dramatic, at least if the prot function is not too concave in K.
In particular, consider the case where an R&D subsidy in the form of a matching grant
disappears. A 50 % (permanent) increase in marginal R&D costs when the subsidy
disappears, should induce a signicant reduction in the optimal amount of knowledge
capital. Hence, it would be optimal to deinvest or at least not to continue investing in
knowledge capital when the R&D subsidy disappears for reasonable specications of the
prot function and the depreciation rate. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the reduction in
the optimal capital stock is 50 % for a given level of output, if the R&D price increases
by 50 %.
From equations (6) and (7) we can deduce some simple comparative statics re-
sults. First, by totally di¤erentiating (7) and adopting the standard assumption of a
decreasing marginal product of knowledge capital, we have
dRt
dw0t
=
r + 
00
< 0 (8)
Furthermore, along an optimal investment path we have that
dRt+1
dw0t
=
dRt+1
dKt
 dKt
dRt
 dRt
dw0t
=   (1  )  1  r + 
00
> 0: (9)
Here dRt+1dKt is calculated by totally di¤erentiating equation (6) and setting dKt+1 equal
to zero. Equation (8) and (9) show that an increase in the marginal cost of R&D
this period will reduce R&D investments in this period and increase R&D investments
next period, all else equal. Hence, a temporary change in the marginal price will cause
intertemporal substitution of the R&D investments.
If rms are subsidized, but not able to decide the size of their subsidized project,
i.e. if they are not subsidized at the margin, their total R&D investments may be
considered exogenous.25 Keeping the assumption of a decreasing marginal product of
knowledge capital, and a constant market price of R&D, and then totally di¤erentiating
equation (7) in period t + 1; when writing Kt+1 as a function of Kt 1; Rt; and Rt+1
24The exact expression also includes the term wt+1 which will be close to zero.
25 If R&D subsidies are completely crowded out, R&D will be endogenous even if the subsidized rms
are not subsidized at the margin, but our results in section 5 suggest that this is not the case.
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with Rt as a function of w0t; we nd that
dRt+1
dRt
=   (1  ) < 0 (10)
Hence, whether or not rms are subsidized at the margin, R&D investments in period
t+ 1 will be reduced relative to period t in rms which lose their subsidies. This runs
contrary to the results reported in Table 7 where the e¤ect of lagged subsidies was
positive or at least not negative. Taken at face value, the result in Table 7 implies that
an increase in past subsidies, all else equal, increases future R&D.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Further support for our claim that the predictions of the conventional model do
not t the data can be found in Figure 2. The leftmost box-and-whisker plot shows
the distribution of growth rates in R&D investments from year t   2 to year t + 2 for
business units which were not subsidized in those years, but which received subsidies
in the middle year, t. This may be compared with the rightmost plot of rms not
subsidized at all.26 Growth is measured in percent of the average level of investments
in year t   2 and year t + 2. This limits the growth interval to 200 %. A rm that
starts investing in R&D will have a positive 200 % growth, while a rm that stops
investing in R&D will have a negative 200 % growth. First note that there are no rms
which stop investing in R&D when their R&D grant expires, and a large number of
rms increase their R&D investments relative to the pre-subsidy level. Average growth
for the subsidized rms is 11 %, whereas average growth for the non-subsidized rms
in the rightmost distribution is -10 %. From the gure we also see that median growth
is higher for rms which have received subsidies.
We conclude from the empirical results that the standard, perpetual inventory
model for knowledge accumulation, equation (6), is too simple to serve as a basis
for a realistic model of R&D investment behavior. We will now consider various modi-
cations of this model, before we turn to a more drastic respecication.
6.2 Modications of the conventional model: Rescue attempts
An obvious rst step in making the perpetual inventory model more realistic is to add
a non-negativity constraint to R&D investments such that R  0, i.e. one cannot
26The box in the Box-and-Whisker plots extends from the 25th percentile (x25) to the 75th per-
centile (x75), i.e. the interquartile range (IQ). The lines emerging from the box are the whiskers,
and extends to the upper and lower adjacent values. The upper adjacent value is dened as the largest
data point less than or equal to x75 + (1:5  IQ). The lower adjacent value is dened symmetrically.
Observed data points more extreme than the adjacent values, are individually plotted. Unfortunately,
the number of business units that have a pattern of subsidies which allows them to be included in
Figure 2 is very small, 13 in the leftmost distribution and 69 in the rightmost distribution. The results
are, however, robust towards extending the sample to include all manufacturing industries. Doing this,
the distributions consist of 29 and 234 business units respectively.
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deinvest by selling already acquired knowledge. The pattern of optimal investments in
this extended version of the model has been examined in some detail by Arrow (1968)
and others. Arrows analysis shows that the basic e¤ect of this extension for the case
with an expected rise in R&D costs, e.g. due to the elimination of R&D subsidies,
would be that the non-negativity constraint will tend to be binding somewhat earlier,
while the option of R&D subsidies still is in place. The intuition is that the rms
stop their R&D investment before the subsidy is removed in order to avoid the non-
negativity constraint being too costly. Clearly, this result does not make the behavior
predicted by the model more realistic, the e¤ect is rather to the contrary, given that
rms typically continue their R&D activity also after the R&D subsidy disappears, as
shown above.
A more promising suggestion would be to add convex adjustment costs similar to
the model used to derive Euler equations for physical capital investment as in Summers
(1981). This would make large changes in investment more costly and induce the rms
to adjust their level of R&D more slowly. Given a reasonable specication of the prot
function, the rms would like to reduce their R&D investments after the R&D subsidies
have been eliminated, and they will do it gradually. However, while we nd it natural
to think about adjustment costs for expanding the R&D activity rapidly, it is less clear
to us whether there are similar adjustment costs involved when downscaling an R&D
project making it optimal to do it gradually.
Finally, let us make a remark about another, less structural, model of R&D invest-
ments, the so-called error-correction model widely used in time-series econometrics.
This model also has the equilibrium condition (7) as its point of departure, but sug-
gests that the rms adjust to deviations from this condition with a lag and then only
gradually due to some unspecied adjustment costs. Our scepticism about what such
adjustment costs are really meant to represent does not need to be repeated; the issue
here is that a lagged response of, say, two years does not make much sense for the kind
of shocks we are considering. That a rm needs two years to realize or at least to react
to an anticipated increase in R&D costs after the grant period has expired, does not
seem very convincing.
To sum up, R&D investment models based on variations of the standard model
for knowledge accumulation predict that rms will reduce their own R&D investments
after an R&D grant has expired or somewhat earlier, possibly down to zero if a non-
negativity constraint on R&D is binding. Otherwise, they will rely on adjustment costs
that we do not nd convincing. These models do not seem appropriate as models of
R&D investment behavior, and we now turn to an alternative specication that will
induce the somewhat sluggish adjustments we observe in the data and which o¤ers a
specic explanation by emphasizing learning and feedback in R&D investments and
knowledge accumulation.
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6.3 Modeling R&D investments with learning-by-doing
The following accumulation equation for knowledge has been suggested by Hall and
Hayashi (1989), Jones (1995), Lach and Rob (1996) and Klette (1996) among others:
Kt+1 = K
 
t R

t : (11)
 is the scale elasticity in knowledge production and  is a parameter capturing the
productiveness of R&D in generating new knowledge (the innovative opportunities of
R&D e¤ort).27 1   (  ) may be considered the depreciation rate, reecting the
depreciation of the private (i.e. the appropriable) part of a rms knowledge capital.
Note that the multiplicative relationship between Kt and Rt on the right hand side
of (11) implies positive complimentarity between new R&D investments and already
acquired knowledge. This can be thought of as representing learning-by-doing in R&D.
A rm operating from period t = 0 to t = T; and which wants to maximize its
present value, faces the following problem
max
R0;:::;RT
PV = f(K0)  w0R0 +
t=TX
t=1
t[(Kt)  wtRt]g (12)
subject to (11). (Kt) is the prot function,  is the discount factor, and wt is the
rms average unit cost of R&D. Note that  = 1= (1 + r) is informative about the
rmsex ante returns to R&D. In order to simplify the model and derive comparative
static results, we make the following assumptions:
 T = 2
  = 1 (i.e. constant returns to scale in knowledge production.)
It is trivial to see that R2 = 0 must be part of an optimal R&D investments path
as the e¤ect of R2 does not materialize within the time period considered. We assume
for simplicity that the rms knowledge capital cannot be sold in the market. Given
this, the problem reduces to
max
R0;R1
PV =

[ (K0)  w0R0] +  [ (K1)  w1R1] + 2 (K2)
	
: (13)
The rst order conditions are
@PV
@R0
=  w00 + 0 (K1)

K0
R0
1 
+2 (1  )0 (K2)K(1 )
2
0 R
(1 ) 1
0 R

1 = 0 (14)
27The exact formulation is from Klette (1996). We recognize that (11) has the rather extreme and
unrealistic implication that a rm which stops its R&D in a single year will lose all its knowledge
capital. Alternative specications that avoid this problem tend to give more complicated estimating
equations that we do not explore in this study. However, as most rms have continuous R&D activity,
we believe equation (11) can be thought of as a reasonable approximation.
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and
@PV
@R1
=  w01 + 20 (K2)

K1
R1
1 
= 0 (15)
This gives the following expressions for optimal R&D investments
R1 = K
1 
0 R

0

0 (K2)
w01
 1
1 
(16)
and
R0 = K0


w00
 1
1 
"
0 (K1) +  (1  )
 
0 (K2)
 1
1 


w01
 
1 
# 1
1 
(17)
We are particularly interested in the e¤ects of varying w0; the marginal cost of R&D.
The relevant derivatives are
@R1
@w01
< 0
@R0
@w00
< 0 (18)
@R1
@w00
Q 0 @R0
@w01
Q 0: (19)
The algebraic expressions are given in the appendix.
Consider now the e¤ect on R&D of a subsidy which makes investments in R&D
cheaper at the margin. The same period e¤ect is given in (18), and, not surprisingly,
we see that rms will increase their R&D activity when R&D is subsidized. In this
respect, the model performs similarly to the traditional framework, cf. equation (8).
The dynamic e¤ects, however, are more interesting. From the leftward derivative in
(19) we see that a temporary subsidy at t = 0, may induce the rm to undertake
more R&D also in the next period even if it is not subsidized then. This contrasts the
conventional model of R&D investments, where the dynamic e¤ect of a price decrease
will be negative, cf. equation (9). Note also that it is the diminishing returns to
knowledge capital which make (19) indeterminate. If we isolate the learning-by-doing
feature of our model by assuming that 0 (K) is constant and thereby that 00 (K) = 0;
we see from the equation (36) in the appendix that the pure e¤ect of learning is positive,
i.e. @R1
@w00
< 0: The existence of learning-by-doing in R&D is therefore able to explain the
empirical results in Table 7. From (19) we also see that a known subsidy at t = 1; may
induce the rm to increase its R&D activity already at t = 0: This is another result
which is impossible within the conventional framework built on the analogy between
physical capital and R&D. A rm which knows that capital will be subsidized at t = 1;
and not at t = 0; will denitely not increase its investments in the period when capital
is not subsidized.
The intuition behind the dynamic behavior of our model is that when there is
learning-by-doing in R&D, increased R&D today will make rms more e¢ cient R&D
performers in future periods through their increased knowledge capital. This increases
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the protability of future R&D. Likewise, if a rm gets to know that the price of R&D
will be lowered in the future, it will nd it protable to increase its present R&D, as
this will make it a more e¢ cient R&D performer in future periods when it will increase
its R&D activity due to the lower price.
Note that a subsidy regime which induces rms to increase their same-period R&D
without altering the marginal price will have the same dynamic e¤ects as
@R1
@R0
R 0 @R0
@R1
R 0 (20)
The rightmost result is derived by treating R1 as an exogenous variable and using
implicit derivation on (14). Once again, going to the appendix and setting 00 (K) = 0
in equations (38) and (39), we nd a certain, positive dynamic e¤ect.
7 A structural, econometric analysis of the dynamic ef-
fects of R&D subsidies
We now want to pursue a more complete structural modeling of R&D investments suit-
able for empirical applications, building on the framework of Klette (1996) and Klette
and Johansen (1998). First we present the model and extends it by incorporating
uncertainty in the knowledge production function, as uncertainty is an important char-
acteristic of R&D investments. Next, we modify the model to handle R&D subsidies,
and derive the estimation equation.
7.1 An empirical innite horizon model with uncertainty in knowl-
edge production
To incorporate uncertainty in the knowledge production function, rewrite (11)
Kt+1 = K
 
t R

t "t (21)
where "t is a mean-one stochastic factor accounting for the randomness in research
activities. One way to identify the optimal investment behavior given the accumulation
equation above is to consider the Bellman-equation
V (Kt) = max
Rt
ft (Kt)  wtRt + Et [V (Kt+1)]g
= max
Rt
ft (Kt)  wtRt + Et [t+1 (Kt+1)  wt+1Rt+1]
+2Et [V (Kt+2 )]g; (22)
where Kt+1 is as specied in (21). Et is the expectation operator, conditioned on the
rms information set available when it makes its decision about the investment Rt:
We can identify an optimal path by considering the marginal change in Rt+1 induced
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by a marginal change in Rt such that an optimal path remains unchanged from period
t+ 2 onwards, i.e.
EtdKt+2 = Etd
h
(K t R

t "t)
 Rt+1"t+1
i
= Et

 (  ) Kt+2
Rt
dRt + 
Kt+2
Rt+1
dRt+1

= Et

Kt+2

(  ) dRt
Rt
+
dRt+1
Rt+1

= 0 (23)
implying that, in expectational terms,
dRt+1
dRt
=   (  ) Rt+1
Rt
: (24)
The rst order condition associated with (22), given that Kt+2 is xed is
w0t =  Et

0t+1(Kt+1)
@Kt+1
@Rt
  w0t+1
dRt+1
dRt

(25)
which, using (21) and (24), can be restated as
w0tRt =  Et [
0
t+1(Kt+1)Kt+1] + (  )Et [w0t+1Rt+1]: (26)
A common specication of the prot function implies that 0t(Kt)Kt =  St, where
St is sales and  is a parameter that is informative about the value of the rms
knowledge capital stock relative to sales (see Klette, 1996).28 Hence, an optimal R&D
investment path requires that
w0tRt =  Et [St+1] + (   )Et [w0t+1Rt+1] (27)
The Euler equation (27) gives a tight relationship between R&D expenditures in period
t and expected sales and planned R&D expenditures in period t+ 1.29
28More specically, it is the value of a rmsknowledge capital stock relative to sales for a rm with
very low, but positive R&D intensity.
29The Euler equation does not have a causal interpretation, hence, one may also express the relation-
ship as Et [w0t+1Rt+1] =
1
(  )w
0
tRt   (  )Et [St+1]. Interestingly, this relationship is, in terms of
variables, identical to one suggested in an early contribution by Manseld (1962). Manseld derives his
relationship from a simple heuristic model for how managers dermines next years R&D expenditures.
His reasoning is inspired by interviews with o¢ cials of about 200 US corporations. A notable di¤erence
between our structural equation and Manselds regression, is that he both expects and estimates a
positive coe¢ cient on sales.
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7.2 Incorporating matching grantsR&D subsidies in the empirical
model
To incorporate public R&D-subsidies letRt = RPPt +R
PG
t +R
G
t . Based on the discussion
in section 2, we have three analytically interesting situations which imply di¤erent
modications to the Euler equation:
1. If there is full crowding out, we cannot distinguish between the R&D investments
of subsidized and non-subsidized rms. The rms cannot be subsidized at the
margin, and the Euler equation does not change.
2. If there is less than full crowding out, but not a signicant degree of additionality,
rms are not likely to be subsidized at the margin. The subsidies do, however,
increase the rmstotal R&D-investments. A situation where there is signicant
additionality, but where rms nonetheless are constrained with respect to the
size of the subsidized project, will have the same implications with respect to the
Euler equation. We will discuss these implications below.
3. If there is signicant additionality, and the rms are not constrained with respect
to the size of the subsidized project, the marginal cost of R&D is given by equation
(3), with  = 1 as a limiting case implying that there is full additionality.
In the cases grouped under item 2 above, w0 is not a¤ected by the subsidy, hence
w0 = w: Furthermore, RG and RPG are exogenous to our analysis. In these cases,
introducing public R&D-subsidies induces two changes in the Bellman equation (22),
and these are the replacement of R by RPP as the control variable and the replacement
of R by
 
RPP +RPG

inside the brace. The rst order condition (25), then becomes30
wt =  Et
"
0t+1(Kt+1)
@Kt+1
@RPPt
  wt+1
dRPPt+1
dRPPt
#
(28)
which can be rewritten
wtRt =  Et [
0
t+1(Kt+1)Kt+1] + (  )Et [wt+1Rt+1]: (29)
This equation is, somewhat surprisingly, identical to equation (26). As long as a rm
is not subsidized at the margin, therefore, its optimal R&D investment path will follow
(26), and hence (27), whether it receives subsidies or not. This, however, is not to
say that receiving subsidies is without implications for the rmsinvestment decision,
something which can be seen by rewriting (27) specifying the various components of
30We assume here that
dRPGt+1
dRPPt
= 0: In a more complete model where one endogenizes the allocation
of R&D subsidies, one would want to allow the amount of privately nanced R&D invested this year to
inuence the amount of subsidies received next year. Such a ne point, however, is beyond the scope
of this exposition.
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Rt and Rt+1:
wt
 
RPPt +R
PG
t +R
G
t

=  Et [St+1]
+(   )Et [wt+1
 
RPPt+1 +R
PG
t+1 +R
G
t+1

] (30)
We see that a rm which does not receive subsidies at time t (when it decides RPPt ),
but which does expect to receive subsidies at time t+ 1, will undertake more R&D at
time t than a rm with the same expectations about sales, but which does not expect
to receive subsidies in the next period. There is a simple rationale for this: The rm
knows that it will receive some additional R&D resources in the next period which,
by assumption, cannot be completely crowded out. According to equation (21), these
resources can be utilized more e¢ ciently the higher its knowledge capital base, Kt+1;
at that time. Given this, it is optimal for the rm to preparefor the expected R&D-
expansion in advance by building up more knowledge through an increase in RPPt : Due
to the same dynamic e¤ect, a rm which receives subsidies at time t; but which does
not expect to receive subsidies at time t+1, will do more R&D at time t+1; than a rm
with the same expectations about sales, but which does not receive subsidies at time
t: This is because the subsidized rm starts out at time t+ 1 with a larger knowledge
capital base than the non-subsidized rm, something which makes it a more e¢ cient
knowledge producer. For this reason the subsidized rm nds it optimal to invest
more in R&D at time t+1 than it would have done without the subsidy at time t: This
will of course also increase its knowledge capital at time t+ 2; relative to the scenario
without a subsidy at time t; and consequently we can conclude that a temporary R&D
subsidy which is not completely crowded out, will have a lasting positive impact on the
rms future R&D investments. This e¤ect will of course be more signicant the less
crowding out or more additionality there is associated with the subsidy.
Let us now consider the case described under item 3 above, i.e. the case with
additionality and where the rms decide the size of the subsidized projects. In a period
where rms are subsidized, their marginal cost of R&D is given by equation (3). We
must then distinguish between three di¤erent situations;
(i) the rms are subsidized at the margin at time t, but do not expect to be subsidized
at the margin at time t+ 1:
(ii) the rms are not subsidized at the margin at time t, but expect to be subsidized
at the margin at time t+ 1:
(iii) the rms are subsidized at the margin at time t, and expect to be subsidized at
the margin at time t+ 1:
When the rms are not subsidized at the margin, their marginal cost of R&D is
w0 = w; and this makes it possible to easily incorporate a fourth category within the
framework that we are now building up. This category comprises all other rms, i.e.
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(iv) the rms which are not subsidized at the margin at time t, and which do not
expect to be subsidized at the margin at time t+ 1.
Using dummy variables to distinguish between rms in di¤erent situations, the
Euler equation (27), becomes
D2 +D4 + (D1 +D3)

1 + 

wtRt =  Et [St+1]
+(  )Et

D1 +D4 + (D2 +D3)

1 + 

wt+1Rt+1

(31)
where D1 is one for rms in category (i) and zero otherwise, D2 is one for rms in
category (ii) and zero otherwise, D3 is one for rms in category (iii) and zero other-
wise, and D4 is one for rms in category (iv) and zero otherwise. Given the application
and data collection procedure, cf. footnote 13, it seems likely that the rms are well
informed one year in advance about whether or not they will receive subsidies. Assum-
ing, therefore, perfect foresight with respect to next years subsidies, equation (31) can
be reformulated
wtRt =  Et [St+1] +


f(D1 +D3)  Et [St+1]g
+(   )Et [wt+1Rt+1]
+
(   )

fD1  Et [wt+1Rt+1]g
 (   )
1 + 
fD2  Et [wt+1Rt+1]g : (32)
Note that as  ! 0; some of the coe¢ cients go to innity, once again reecting the
fact that rms are not likely to be subsidized at the margin for such values of ;
and, thus, that there are not likely to be rms in category (i)-(iii) if  is low. Note
also that if some rms are misclassied as belonging to one of the categories (i)-(iii)
when belonging to category (iv), these observations still have all the relevant variables
included. They do, however, also have non-zero additional variables, namely those
involving dummies in (32). From an econometric point of view, this can be interpreted
as the inclusion of irrelevant variables, and the estimated coe¢ cients for these variables
should be insignicant and close to zero if in fact the majority of rms are not subsidized
at the margin. The correct specication in that case is simply
wtRt =  Et [St+1] + (   )Et [wt+1Rt+1]: (33)
7.3 Estimating the Euler Equation
We start out by assuming that subsidized rms are subsidized at the margin. This
hypothesis can be tested. Equation (32) can be estimated and will, given the necessary
data, identify the degree of additionality through the parameter  if the hypothesis is
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correct. If it is wrong, it will be falsied through non-signicant parameters for the
terms involving dummy variables.
The Norwegian R&D surveys contain information on planned R&D, Et [wt+1Rt+1],
but not on expected sales. To circumvent this problem, we have used real sales in the
following year as a proxy, and instrumented this variable by its present and lagged
value in order to avoid the endogeneity problem thus involved.31 The sales data are
merged in from the manufacturing statistics.
Another problem is to decide which rms belong to which of the four categories
determining the values of the dummy variables. Assuming perfect foresight one year
ahead is reasonable and helps, but we have annual R&D data only for the period 1982-
1985. For the period 1985-1995, the R&D surveys were only conducted every second
year, and, hence, for these years we do not know which rms received a subsidy in period
t + 1: One way to proceed, is to assume that rms received subsidies at time t + 1 if
they received subsidies both at time t and t + 2; as there is positive autocorrelation
in subsidy allocation. Likewise, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that rms
did not receive subsidies at time t + 1 if they did not receive subsidies at time t nor
at time t+ 2 : Similar reasoning cannot be adopted for rms which received subsidies
at t, but not at time t + 2, or the other way around. These observations, therefore,
have to be excluded. Unfortunately, then, there are rather few observations in our
data set which can identify the coe¢ cients in front of the last two terms in equation
(32), as the majority of the observations are from the period 1985-1995, and it is only
a small fraction of the rms that change their subsidy recipient status in the years
1982-1985 . There are 17 observations in category (i), 13 observations in category (ii),
31 observations in category (iii) and 121 observations in category (iv). To correct for
heteroscedasticity, all observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales.
Further information about the variable construction can be found in section 3.3.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The estimation results are given in Table 8. The coe¢ cients of equation (32) are
reported in column (1). Two of the dummy variable terms are statistically insignicant
and have opposite signs to those predicted by theory. The last one is correctly signed
and weakly signicant. Using the correctly signed and weakly signicant coe¢ cient to
identify  gives b = 7:45; a value way outside the theoretical range,  2 h0; 1i. This
means that this coe¢ cient is also too close to zero to have a meaningful interpretation.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that matching grants subsidies do not a¤ect
the rmsmarginal price of R&D, a nding which is to be expected if there is little
31The rmsproduction function is not shown explicitly in this paper, but production in t+1, Qt+1
will be a function of the knowledge capital stock,Kt+1, and therefore Rt: Sales, St+1 = Pt+1Qt+1 will
then depend on Rt, including any shock, ut to R in period t. This endogeneity problem is avoided if
St+1 is predicted based on the rmsinformation set at t: Since sales are highly correlated over time,
it is natural to use St and St 1 as instruments.
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or no short run additionality associated with the subsidies.32 Recall that our analysis
of matching grants subsidies at the end of section 2 showed that it is unlikely that
rms are subsidized at the margin unless there is a signicant degree of additionality
associated with the subsidies, and that the short run analysis in section 3.3 showed
that there is no crowding out, nor any degree of additionality.
Given the modest size of the data set, the results in column (1) should be considered
explorative.33 If the subsidized rms are not subsidized at the margin, however, all rms
should be reclassied to category (iv), and the dummy variable terms will not be part
of the regression equation. This simplies the analysis and also increases the number
of observations that can be included in the regression. Table 8, column (2) reports
the estimation results based on this assumption. Using this specication (equation
33), both the estimated coe¢ cients are signicant at conventional levels. The point
estimates are  = 0:0033 and (  ) = 0:090. Unfortunately, none of the structural
parameters can be identied separately without strong assumptions as there are two
coe¢ cients and four parameters.34 Something can still be deduced from the estimates,
however. The rst coe¢ cient tells us that an increase in expected sales has a positive
impact on R&D investments as predicted by theory. The second coe¢ cient tells us that
there is a positive relationship between R&D this period and planned R&D in future
periods. This is consistent with the learning-by-doing framework underlying our theory
model.
Finally, let us emphasize that our results do not imply that receiving subsidies
is without implications for the rms investment decision, even if the rms are not
subsidized at the margin, cf. the discussion in section 7.2. If our model is correct,
a rm which does not receive subsidies at time t, but which does expect to receive
subsidies and expand the R&D activity at time t + 1, will undertake more R&D at
time t than a rm with the same expectations about sales, but which does not expect
to receive subsidies in the next period. Learning by doing makes it optimal for the
rm to prepare for the expected R&D-expansion in advance by building up more
knowledge. Due to the same dynamic e¤ect, a rm which receives subsidies at time t;
but which does not expect to receive subsidies at time t+1, will do more R&D at time
t + 1; than a rm with the same expectations about sales, but which does not receive
subsidies at time t: This is because the subsidized rm starts out at time t + 1 with
a larger knowledge capital base then the non-subsidized rm, something which makes
it a more e¢ cient knowledge producer. Hence, a temporary R&D subsidy which is
not completely crowded out, will have a lasting positive impact on the rms future
32An alternative explanation for the results is obviously that the Euler equation model is wrong, or
that the data do not match the concepts needed very well.
33 In follow up work, we hope to re-estimate the model on a larger and more recent data set since the
Norwegian R&D survey have been conducted annually again since 2001.
34Drawing on Klette (1996) and Klette and Johansen (1998) it is possible to derive a performance
equation within the same framework. This will allow separate identication of . We have, however,
tried using the estimated parameters in Klette and Johansen (1998) to identify , but this strategy
gives -estimates that seem implausible low.
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R&D investments. This e¤ect will be more signicant the less crowding out or more
additionality there is associated with the subsidy.
8 Conclusions and future research
Whereas many countries subsidize R&D in private companies through tax credits, subsi-
dies to the Norwegian high-tech industries have mainly been given as matching grants,
i.e. the subsidies are targeted, and the rms have to contribute a 50 % own risk capital
to the projects. It is, however, an open question to what extent this induces rms
to increase their total R&D investments as they may reduce non-subsidized R&D ac-
tivities upon receiving an R&D grant. Our results suggest that grants do not crowd
out privately nanced R&D, but that subsidized rms do not increase their privately
nanced R&D either. Hence, the own risk capital in the projects seems to be taken
from ordinary R&D budgets, and there is no additionalityassociated with matching
grants subsidies.
Our results also suggest that the subsidies most e¢ ciently stimulate R&D invest-
ments in small and large rms as opposed to medium size rms. One hypothesis which
may explain this is that R&D investments in small rms are liquidity constrained,
whereas large rms are so closely monitored by the governmental agencies awarding
the subsidies that it is di¢ cult for them to receive support for projects which are prof-
itable without subsidies. A variable measuring the rmscash ow does not indicate
that small rms are liquidity constrained, however. This might be because this variable
rather measures the present success of the rms, something which may be considered
a proxy for future success and thereby for the incentive to invest in R&D. Our main
result of neither crowding out, nor additionality, seems to be robust both over time and
across a wider sample of manufacturing rms than those belonging to the traditional
high-tech industries. In addition, there are no clear cut di¤erences between the e¤ects
of subsidies awarded by research councils, industry funds and ministries.
We have also investigated possible long-run e¤ects of R&D subsidies, and we have
shown that the conventional perpetual inventory model of R&D investments predicts
the dynamic e¤ects of subsidies to be negative. There is, however, no empirical evidence
supporting this claim. On the contrary, there are indications of a positive dynamic
e¤ect, i.e. temporary R&D subsidies seem to stimulate rms to increase their R&D
investments even when the grants have expired. We have argued that learning-by-
doing in R&D activities is a possible explanation for this, and our theoretical analysis
shows that such e¤ects alter the predictions of the conventional models. The intuition
behind the dynamic behavior of our model is that with learning-by-doing in R&D,
increased R&D in one period makes rms more e¢ cient R&D performers in future
periods through increased knowledge capital. This increases the protability of future
R&D.
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A structural, econometric model of R&D investments incorporating such learning
e¤ects has been estimated with reasonable results. These results suggest that matching
grants subsidies do not a¤ect the rmsmarginal price of R&D, a nding which is to
be expected if there is little or no additionality associated with subsidies in the period
in which they are awarded.
In future research, it is our ambition to combine the Euler equation in this paper
with the performance equation of Klette (1996), in order to identify the parameters
necessary to predict the strength of the dynamic e¤ects, and not least to estimate the
returns to private and public R&D investments.
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Appendix: Algebraic expressions for the derivatives in sec-
tion 6.3
@R1
@w01
= f00 (K2)

K1
R1
1 
w01
 
"
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1   ()
1
1 

0 (K2)
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1 
# 1
g 1 < 0 (34)
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Figure 2: The change in R&D accompanying a subsidy regime change 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
 
ISIC 382, 383 and 385   
Total no. of observations 697 
     no. of business units 192 
     average no. of observations per business unit 3.6 
Observations with subsidies 300 
     subsidized from research councils 197 
     subsidized from industry funds 111 
     subsidized from ministries 98 
Observations of small business units (Average no. of workers<25th perc.) 176 
Observations of large business units (Average no. of workers>75th perc.) 168 
Average no. of workers per business unit 334 
     25th. Percentile 58 
     Median 107 
     75th. Percentile 263 
Average R&D intensity 0.07 
Median R&D intensity 0.04 
Average subsidy share (excluding observations with zero subsidy) 0.23 
Median subsidy share (excluding observations with zero subsidy) 0.17 
 
Sample: R&D performing business units in 1982-1995 included in at least two R&D surveys, having at least 20 workers on average, and 
being successfully merged with the manufacturing statistics. The sample is moderately trimmed.  See section 3 for further details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Norwegian interview studies of the crowding out effect of R&D subsidies 
 
Study GF84 HB89 HBW92 HW97 OKOH97  
Sample size 54 191 213 200 49 Weighted 
Time periode 78-82 80-84 84-89 90-95 92-95 average 
Project done without subsidy 34 % 33 % 15 % 6 % 2 % 18 % 
Project delayed or diminished 46 % 45 % 46 % 57 % 28 % 48 % 
Project not done without subsidy 20 % 23 % 40 % 37 % 70 % 34 % 
 
Studies: GF84; Grønhaug and Fredriksen (1984), HB89; Hervik and Brunstad (1989), HBW92; Hervik, Berge and Wicksteed (1992), HW97; 
Hervik and Waagø (1997), OKOH97; Olsen et. al. (1997).  Respondents who could not or did not answer are not included.  
Only in HB89, where the full sample consisted of 230 projects, was this category of any significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between deviation from planned R&D and change in R&D-subsidy 
 
    Corr.coef. Sign.level No. of obs. 
One year horizon: Planned R&D in man-years 0.006 0.95 107 
Two year horizon: Planned R&D in man-years 0.34 0.00 147 
Two year horizon: Planned R&D in kroner 0.17 0.10 99 
 
9 observations in 1991 where deviation from planned R&D measured in man-years and kroner has opposite signs are excluded.   
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Table 4: The effect of R&D-subsidies on total R&D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form linear Linear loglog 
Estimation method fe Diff fe 
       
Sales -0.025** (0.0088) 0.0050 (0.0080) -0.62 (1.52) 
Sales squared 1.5e-8*** (4.7e-7) -2.9e-10 (5.0e-9) 0.020 (0.046) 
Total R&D-subsidy 1.03*** (0.16) 1.06*** (0.17) 0.064*** (0.012) 
Cash flow 0.087*** (0.025) 0.097*** (0.033) 0.019 (0.015) 
       
R-Square 0.95 0.39 0.90 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroskedasticity. Time dummies 
included in all regressions.  The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  The effect of R&D-subsidies on total R&D: Differences between small and large firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form Linear linear Loglog 
Estimation method Fe diff Fe 
       
Sales -0.022*** (0.0084) 0.0076 (0.0074) -0.55 (1.50) 
Sales squared 1.3e-8*** (4.8e-9) -2.6e-9 (5.7e-9) 0.018 (0.046) 
Total R&D-subsidy 0.51* (0.27) 0.47** (0.22) 0.056*** (0.014) 
     *small firm dummy 0.48 (0.32) 0.63** (0.29) 0.022 (0.025) 
     *large firm dummy 0.74** (0.36) 0.74** (0.33) 0.012 (0.032) 
Cash flow 0.041* (0.025) 0.034 (0.025) 0.0093 (0.019) 
     *small firm dummy 0.028 (0.055) 0.040 (0.059) 0.015 (0.032) 
     *large firm dummy 0.056 (0.039) 0.077* (0.047) 0.017 (0.038) 
       
R-Square 0.95 0.41 0.90 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroskedasticity. Time dummies are 
included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Large and small firms are defined as 
firms with average employment below the 25th percetile and above the 75th percentile respectively. 
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Table 6:  The effect of R&D-subsidies on total R&D: Differences between sources of subsidies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form Linear linear Loglog 
Estimation method Fe diff Fe 
       
Sales -0.024*** (0.0087) 0.0050 (0.0080) -0.58 (1.57) 
Sales squared 1.4e-8*** (4.8e-9) -4.8e-10 (5.0e-9) 0.020 (0.048) 
Subsidy from research councils 0.95*** (0.23) 1.57*** (0.59) 0.043*** (0.012) 
Subsidy from industry funds 0.72*** (0.29) 0.97*** (0.26) 0.029*** (0.011) 
R&D grants from ministries 1.17*** (0.25) 1.07*** (0.24) 0.053*** (0.016) 
Cash flow 0.085*** (0.024) 0.098*** (0.033) 0.020 (0.015) 
       
R-Square 0.95 0.39 0.89 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
Time dummies are included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  The effect of R&D-subsidies on total R&D: Dynamics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form linear linear loglog 
Estimation method fe Diff fe 
       
Sales -0.020** (0.019) -0.0058 (0.013) 3.38 (3.35) 
Sales squared 1.2e-8*** (1.1e-8) 4.4e-9 (9.0e-9) -0.099 (0.10) 
Total R&D-subsidy 1.15*** (0.24) 0.96*** (0.32) 0.051*** (0.020) 
Total R&D-subsidy at t-2 0.36* (0.20) 0.16 (0.15) -0.019 (0.016) 
Cash flow 0.083** (0.037) 0.087** (0.035) 0.038 (0.024) 
       
R-Square 0.96 0.29 0.91 
No. of observations 379 181 379 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroskedasticity. Time dummies are 
included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 8: Euler equation estimates 
 
 (1) (2) 
     
Expected sales 0.0023* (0.0013) 0.0033** (0.0016) 
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t or both at t and t+1 (D1+D3) -0.0020 (0.0029)   
Planned R&D 0.82*** (0.017) 0.090*** (0.031) 
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t (D1) -0.22 (0.17)   
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t+1 (D2) -0.097* (0.051)   
     
Root MSE 5.7 13.6 
No. of observations 182 528 
 
2SLS regression on nominal values.  Sales at period t+1 is used as proxy for expected sales and instrumented with sales in period t and t-1. 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales to correct for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
